During the American occupation of Afghanistan, ISIS significantly intensified its attacks against the camps, frontlines, and forces of the Islamic Emirate across several regions, particularly in eastern Afghanistan. The provinces of Kunar and Nangarhar witnessed the most intense and violent confrontations between the two sides following ISIS’s emergence in the country.
At the beginning, the Islamic Emirate sought to avoid internal conflict that could distract from its primary objective of resisting the American occupation and its allies. It attempted to keep its fighters and ranks away from infighting and made repeated efforts to advise those who had joined ISIS to stop attacking the Emirate and its units. These efforts were sincere and persistent. However, instead of targeting American and NATO forces, ISIS increasingly directed its attacks against the Islamic Emirate, resulting in prolonged and bloody clashes.
When it became clear that advice and mediation were ineffective—particularly as ISIS launched attacks alongside intense American airstrikes and ground operations conducted by Western forces and the former U.S.-backed Afghan government—the Islamic Emirate was compelled to change its approach. It confronted what it viewed as an aggressive ISIS faction that showed no regard for the sanctity of life or the principles of jihad. The Emirate announced military operations against ISIS in Kunar and Nangarhar and, over time, succeeded in reclaiming large areas from the group, bringing it close to complete defeat. This outcome would have been final had the remaining ISIS elements not surrendered to the former Afghan government, which then transported them by aircraft to Kabul.
After the liberation of Afghanistan and before the complete withdrawal of foreign forces, all ISIS members who had previously surrendered while surrounded in Kunar and Nangarhar were deliberately released. This action represented another serious consequence of the American occupation and its allies as they departed the country. As a result, the Islamic Emirate faced a renewed challenge: tracking down escaped ISIS fighters. Although ISIS escalated its attacks following the release of its prisoners—targeting Islamic Emirate forces in Kabul, Herat, Balkh, Nangarhar, and Kunar—the Emirate carried out extensive security operations. These efforts led to the arrest of many ISIS members, while others were killed or fled into Pakistani territory, where they had originally regrouped.
The roots of ISIS in the region can be traced to camps located in Pakistan’s tribal areas. These camps brought together militants, many of whom reportedly had criminal backgrounds. They initially pledged allegiance to an individual known as Hafiz Saeed before moving into Afghanistan, where additional recruits joined them. Later, they pledged allegiance to ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, declared themselves “Wilayat Khorasan,” and began attacking Islamic Emirate positions.
According to ISIS members arrested in Afghanistan, most attacks carried out inside the country were planned in Pakistani regions such as Balochistan, Karachi, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. As pressure mounted from Islamic Emirate operations, ISIS-Khorasan leadership reportedly convened in Pakistan. Its leader, Sanaullah Shهاب al-Muhajir, is believed to be based there, along with most senior leaders and members. These elements were allegedly provided with guesthouses, training facilities, and recruitment centers from which they coordinated attacks across the region.
The most recent ISIS attack targeting mine workers in Tajikistan near the Afghan–Tajik border was also reportedly planned in Pakistan, based on confessions obtained from a senior ISIS member arrested by Afghan intelligence. The apparent objective was to disrupt improving relations between Afghanistan and Tajikistan, which had recently taken steps toward normalization after years of strained ties.
Similarly, recent ISIS attacks in Afghanistan, China, and Central Asia are said to align with plans formulated in Pakistan, particularly within areas linked to its intelligence apparatus. Evidence reportedly points to logistical assistance and intelligence coordination, supported by statements from detained ISIS members.
Following their defeat in Afghanistan, many ISIS fighters were relocated to Pakistan’s tribal regions, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Balochistan, and even parts of Punjab. There, they allegedly received shelter, medical care, identity documentation, communication tools, transportation, assistance in crossing the Durand Line, recruitment support, and opportunities to reorganize and retrain.
The presence of ISIS leadership and facilities inside Pakistan has been widely noted, occurring within the awareness of Pakistan’s military establishment. In recent months, cities such as Karachi and Peshawar have seen the killing of senior ISIS-Khorasan figures by unidentified attackers. Additionally, ISIS-Khorasan’s long-time media official and spokesman, Sultan Aziz Azzam, was recently arrested by Pakistani authorities despite having operated there openly for years.
Sources suggest that Azzam’s arrest was linked to internal disputes within ISIS-Khorasan. After Shهاب al-Muhajir consolidated power by sidelining earlier leaders of the Khorasan branch and surrounding himself with close associates, tensions intensified within the organization. Disillusioned former leaders reportedly sought protection from Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).
According to these sources, Azzam was marginalized under the pretext of mediating with dissatisfied ISIS leaders in eastern Afghanistan. During this period, he was allegedly involved in negotiations and planning with ISIS elements and ISI officials at a guesthouse affiliated with Pakistani intelligence. As disagreements deepened, Pakistani authorities announced his arrest—reflecting a pattern in which operatives suspected of deviating from intelligence directives are either detained or eliminated.
Through these actions, Pakistan is portrayed as using ISIS as a pressure tool against states—including Afghanistan—at a time when bilateral relations have sharply deteriorated, leading to border closures and a suspension of trade and transit.
Based on the accumulated evidence, a key factor behind ongoing violence, extremism, and political instability in the region is Pakistan’s long-standing dual policy. While presenting itself internationally as a partner in counterterrorism efforts, it is simultaneously accused of supporting, managing, and selectively deploying armed groups. Under this approach, armed actors are judged not by ideology or principle, but by strategic utility.
Within this framework, ISIS-Khorasan is unlikely to be treated as a serious threat by Pakistan unless it loses its geopolitical value or comes under overwhelming international pressure. A recent example often cited is the timing of the arrest of Sultan Aziz Azzam, which coincided with the visit of Pakistan’s Army Chief, General Asim Munir, to the United States—an action widely interpreted as a calculated move to ease external pressure, gain diplomatic credibility, and secure political concessions.
